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The outbreak of the First World War caught America in a situation where American companies
and consumers were threatened by a shortage of chemical materials. German chemicals were a
major factor in food production and consumer goods throughout the industrialized world. Whether
these American chemical companies were producing dyes for the production of paper, clothing,
fertilizer, or munitions, the lack of imported German component chemicals threatened to drive
prices to exorbitant levels or stop production altogether. In order for the American economy to not
come to a halt during the course of the war, American chemical companies worked tirelessly to
create their own chemical formulas, expand their production base, and gear towards full war
production as the United States was slowly pulled into the conflict.
The United States initially had no interest in involving itself in a European war. In theory, the
decision to remain neutral kept America out of the direct line of fire, and allowed it to sell to and
buy materials from both warring sides. American companies sought to make profits by selling war
materials, as well as civilian goods, to both the Entente powers, Great Britain, France, and Imperial
Russia, as well as the Central Powers, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Munition export sales
created a massive boom in American business, though these were protested vigorously by pacifists,
clergy, and nationalist groups within the United States.
However, the actual physical geography of the warring nations and military mastery of the sea by
the Entente Powers quickly ensured that German chemicals could not reach American plants. The
British Grand Fleet and French Navy had slowly been establishing a naval blockade to anything
going into or out of Germany. Initially the British and French blockades enraged Americans:
British and French warships could, and would, stop American merchant ships heading for Central
Power ports. In the process of these stops, British and French sailors would search the ships for
contraband and if this was found the ship and cargo were impounded. This was seen by Americans
as a violation of their neutrality: in their view they should be able to trade anything with anyone
as they were not a combatant nation. However, the United States shifted to more trade with the
Entente Powers, as export to these nations was easiest.

Potash Fertilizer
Some of the most critical materials that were denied to American consumers involved the
chemicals needed to create fertilizers. One of the most missed chemical compounds blocked from
Americans was German potash. Potash is an alkaline potassium compound that can be used as a
highly effective fertilizer. It is an essential ingredient of commercial fertilizer, which was
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increasingly necessary for long-used fields.1 And since potassium is essential to plant life,
without this central ingredient chemical fertilizers cannot effectively increase the yields of
crops planted.
At the outbreak of the First World War, the best fields for this material were found in Germany
and it had been a major source of their export wealth. European and American farmers used the
potash as a way for plants to retain water, grow larger, and generally increase the productivity of
their fields. American farmers had become quite reliant on German exports as the American
chemical industry did not have an existing domestic source of potash.
Large German chemical corporate conglomerations, or better known as cartels, were not keen to
share the formulas with foreign competitors and buyers. They jealously guarded their secrets and
had a virtual monopoly on the production of potash. With the outbreak of war, German potash
could no longer be exported to meet the demand. German cartels had for decades refused to
manufacture their chemicals in American plants because the monopoly on those formulae and
shipments was a major source of wealth for German owners, investors, and the German
Government.
Due to the British blockade, supplies of potash and other chemicals could not be sent to the United
States. In order to crush the German economy and military, Britain expanded its list of items that
were deemed contraband. Any merchant ships going to Germany carrying foodstuffs, medical
supplies, and an exhaustive list of other items, could be seized. In 1915, Germany, facing the reality
that their merchant ships could not sail to America, initiated an embargo on potash. The logic
behind the move was to prevent their potash from going to America and then being exported from
there to England. Historian William Haynes, writing about the situation after the war, states:
Even if our Government [United States] should obtain from the British free passage for
this essential fertilizer material through the blockade, it was recognized that both English
munition plants and farmlands were in as dire need of potash salts as ourselves. Under the
circumstances, Germany would no doubt be as rigid in her embargo as was England in her
blockade.2

German potash stocks were used by Germany and Austria-Hungary to try and fend off famine in
those empires during the war. Later, those same stocks of potash would be used to make up for the
loss of imported sources of nitrate for making munitions. The potash was chemically altered, by
the Haber synthetic-ammonia process, in order to make explosives for artillery shells and bombs,
as well as propellants for bullets. Germany, along with most other countries in the world, received
most of its salt-peter and nitrogen supplies from Chile. The British blockade prevented that supply
from reaching Germany, prompting the need for other processes to obtain the materials. Haynes
explains:
In Germany this problem had a double meaning. To the Kaiser’s militaristic clique, which foresaw
a British blockade of Chilean salt-peter, nitrogen was as important for explosives as for fertilizer.
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So while Wilhelm II rattled his sword noisily for several years, he did not throw away the
scabbard until the Haber synthetic-ammonia process and its companion, the Ostwald process
for the conversion of ammonia to nitric acid, had been perfected and tested. 3
Starting in September 1914, American newspapers, politicians, and scholars quickly sought to
assuage concerns from farmers about the loss of this core fertilizer component. An article
published by The New York Times on 18 October 1914 discussed the issue: “A practical monopoly
[sic] in the potash market has been maintained in America by German syndicates. The war’s
embargo has brought a complete severance between supply and demand.”4 The reality of having
almost no readily available large stocks of potash had the potential to drastically reduce American
food supplies. American chemists were charged with finding an alternative compound to keep
crops growing.
The lack of German potash forced American chemical companies to develop American potash or
to find an alternative fertilizer to make up the shortfall. In an interview with the New York Globe,
Dr. William H. Nichols stated “Stassfurt (Germany) potash supply, upon which the world depends,
is, of course, entirely cut off. The American farmer may have to get along for the time being
without potash fertilizers; but other substitutes will take their place for the present.”5 At the time
Dr. Nicholas was Chairman of the Board of General Chemical Company and also the president of
the Nichols Copper Company. His expertise was sought out in order to assure Americans that the
shortages of potash would not cripple farmers. His advice in 1914 was simply that these vital
chemicals could be obtained from alternate European or South American sources or could be lived
without altogether.
By 1915, the lack of German potash and limited success of American chemists and chemicals to
fill the gap was beginning to be felt. Prices of the remaining stock of potash soared and became
increasingly cost-prohibitive to the average farmers. According to Corda (qtd. In Jenson) “the price
remained fairly stable at about $8 to $10 a ton until 1911-12 when it began to rise, perhaps because
of the unsettled political situation in Europe.”6 Measures needed to be taken to ensure that
American farmers would be able to fertilize their fields. The price of potash would jump to nearly
$150 per ton by 1917, an exorbitant cost that was prohibitive.
Suitable alternative sites for the production of potash inside American borders were in some cases
found in the most unlikely of circumstance. Richard Jensen describes a perfect example of this
process, by which the small towns of Antioch and Hoffland, Nebraska, became boomtowns
because of the potash industry. “Early in 1917 several potash lakes were discovered on state-owned
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school land, and a company was quickly formed to lease the mineral rights.”7 These
chemical companies had to quickly establish rights to take over the lakes, build the factories
necessary to create the potash, and finally have transportation systems that would allow for the
finished product to hit the market. The population of the towns swelled as workers and chemists
swarmed in to build and labor in the plants.
Nebraska became a center of potash production, but it was by no means an easy process, nor was
it the only state to have the rare materials. Twenty-one states in total would find the means to build
128 plants to create an American potash industry. The massive price of building these facilities
was only exacerbated by the inflation that the original shortages of potash caused. J. W. Turrentine,
writing in 1950, also describes the difficulty that American chemical companies had when
confronted with creating the potash industry from the ground up:
The critical nature of the emergency did not permit technological research. On the contrary, potash
was being extracted in many instances by main force and awkwardness. As a result, with the
reappearance of German potash on the American market at a carefully regulated descending scale
of prices, the wartime domestic industry faded away, with only three units surviving to recent
years.8
The completion of the factories and the economic boom to those states lasted only two years: by
1919, the cheaper German potash began to become available again. Those newly built chemical
potash factories ended up closing during and after 1919 as the profits of companies plummeted.
While potash fertilizer was important to food production inside the United States, it was also
needed for non-food agricultural work. Cotton production in the Southern states also required
fertilizers. The lack of German potash saw a precipitous fall in the amount of fertilizer available
for Southern farmers. The lack of fertilizer had the potential effect of producing poor cotton crops,
thus reducing the amount available for the export market. Edwin J. Clapp sums up the situation:
As a result of these conditions the use of fertilizer in this country for the agricultural season of
1915 was greatly curtailed. This was especially true of the cotton states, where a reduction of 40
to 50 per cent was reported. Such fertilizer as was used contained less potash than usual. The effect
on the cotton crop may not be noticeably great for the year 1915; but if the war continues and in
1916 no more potash is available than this year, the results, according to agricultural experts, will
be very marked.9
The United States produced far more cotton per year than its own industry consumed. This had
been the case since cotton had become the major crop of the South during the nineteenth century.
With the outbreak of World War I, the demand for additional supplies for textile industries all over
the world had the potential to boost a slumping pre-war American economy. But if the lack of
cheap, available chemical fertilizer could not be found, then cotton crops would fail and Southern
farmers faced economic collapse. Over the course of the war, the cotton that was grown in the
United States shifted away from export and was used instead domestically by American textile
7
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manufacturers. The lack of fertilizer, as well as foreign markets, saw the American cotton
farmer drastically lose economic power.
The lack of potash affected the growth of crops on the Pacific coast of the United States as well.
California had, and still has, a tremendous ability to grow foodstuffs that can be either consumed
domestically or abroad. In order to keep those vast fields productive, scientists in California turned
to a truly unique solution to the fertilizer shortage: seaweed would be a new major chemical
component. As Peter Neushul states, “Responding to this wartime opportunity, enterprising
American businessmen built a new industry designed to extract both potash and acetone from
California’s giant kelp. Although short-lived, California’s World War I kelp industry was the
largest ever created in the United States for the processing of plants from the ocean.”10 Initially
harvesting the kelp was hazardous and exhausting work for the people involved in the process.
The earliest version of harvesting the plant was to physically haul the kelp out of the water and
onto the ship, a difficult practice as the crew had to physically secure the kelp underwater and then
hoist it up. This method was detrimental because the kelp stalk itself was displaced from the seabed
and could not be regrown. Between 1917 and 1918, the kelp harvesting industry lined up its
technological issues and began producing a vital alternative to German potash
A vast kelp harvesting and processing industry was born along the California coastline in order to
boost domestic potash production. Factories, ships, and railway lines were laid in order for the
kelp to be harvested, dried, and finally processed into potash for use either in the United States or
to be exported abroad. The kelp potash was used to supplement the fertilizer industry and in the
application of munitions manufacturing.

Potassium Nitrate as a Weapon
Potash was an essential component in the manufacture of chemical fertilizers, but it can also be a
key in the creation of munitions. A different blend of potassium and other chemical elements
similar to potash is known as saltpeter, or potassium nitrate, an essential piece in black powder
production. Saltpeter can be found in several varieties each of which has different applications.
The most soughtafter version, before and during the First World War, was Chilean sodium nitrate.
This version of saltpeter comes from the deserts of Chile and was a major source of wealth for that
South American country. By the end of the nineteenth century, the last major supplies of naturally
occurring Chilean nitrate lay in the Atacama Desert.
By 1911, Chile was supplying the majority of the entire world in nitrates. European powers sought
to have close ties to Chile hoping that favorable diplomatic relations would lead to a steady supply
of nitrates. As mentioned above, Chilean nitrate was used to produce not only fertilizers, but
propellants used for bullets, explosives used in artillery shells and bombs. According to Manuel
Bastias Saaverda, “Before 1914, only one-fifth of all Chilean nitrate exports were consumed in the
powder and explosives industry; almost four-fifths of all nitrate exports were used for military
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purposes thereafter.”11 Without the supply of this rare mineral for continuous manufacturing
of munitions, a long war would be out of the question for potential combatants.
Germany had a massive advantage over the Allied Forces during the early years of the war due to
stockpiling the Chilean nitrates in anticipation of war. It also had an additional edge because most
of the enemy European nations needed German chemicals to manufacture their own munitions.
This initial lack of extra nitrates to manufacture new munitions was a terror for both those Allied
soldiers fighting in France and the people at home. This early German advantage was also tied to
the fact the Britain and France had to switch their industries over to the large-scale manufacture of
war goods, something that did not come into full effect until 1916.
This lack of munitions caused a number of issues for both the British and French militaries.
Between 1914 and 1915, the rapid consumption of shells by artillery pieces on the Western Front
meant that rationing of those munitions needed to take place. Allied forces that went onto the
offensive and those launching counterattacks had strategically used their limited shell supply to
maximum effect. Even the vaunted British and French fleets had to keep a close eye on the amount
of heavy ammunition their ships used until newly implemented war production could match
demand.
Initially the British government was quick to dismiss the shortfall of chemicals needed to replace
munitions used on the frontlines. In addition to a lack of chemicals, some newspapers actually
mentioned the lack of British chemical engineers to manufacture them. This issue was rather
eloquently addressed by a Times of London article from 18 August 1914:
We ought, however, at once to admit the real, if unpalatable, fact that we have not
encouraged the technical side of chemical education, which is so necessary for the
manufacture of fine chemicals, and that as a consequence we lack men with the necessary
practical knowledge.12

This practical viewpoint on the lack of chemists in Britain skilled at replicating many of the
imported chemicals from Germany during 1914 was lost over the course of the war. Instead of
focusing on the need to train the existing and new chemical engineers to help the war of munitions,
the British government sought out other reasons for early shortfalls.
During 1914 and early 1915, the British government repeatedly claimed that the issue was not so
much one of lack of supply or technical skill, rather they attributed it to a lack of will-power on
the part of the workers in the existing plants. The government insisted that strikes organized by
industrial workers consistently held up production rather than a lack of vital chemicals. In
discussing a strike of engineers at Clyde, in The Times the Chief Industrial Commissioner for the
British government, Sir George Askwith, said “I am by the Government that important munitions
of war urgently required by the Navy and the Army are being held up by the present cessation of
work.”13
11

Manuel Bastias Saaverda, “Nitrate,” International Encyclopedia of World War I, 1914-1918, 8 Oct. 2014,
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/nitrate, accessed Sept. 1, 2018.

12

“Imports from Germany.” The Times (London, England), issue 40,608, Aug. 18, 1914, p. 3.

13

“A Call to Work,” The Times (London, England), issue 40,789, Feb. 27, 1915, p. 9.
3A2–6

PAPER 3A2 – JASON SZILAGYI

This lack of chemical components for the British, as well as the French, left the Allies in a
precarious position for resupplying their armies fighting the Central Powers. If the British
couldn’t produce their own domestic supplies of munitions, another source of those rare chemicals
needed to be found. One solution was to buy completed munitions from the United States. This
was a risky move to undertake for both the British and Americans, as the sale of munitions to only
select warring countries would technically violate American neutrality. The Allies could also not
be one hundred percent sure whether that American munitions would go only to themselves and
not be sold to the Central Powers.
The question of what exactly could be shipped to warring or neutral nations became a topic of
great concern. The biggest initial concern for American companies, government officials, and
private citizens was whether items deemed contraband would result in American ships being seized
and impounded. Since the British Grand Fleet controlled the Atlantic Ocean and access to
Continental ports, American ships were routinely stopped and searched by British warships. Those
heading for German ports were seized while those heading to British or French ports were allowed
to conduct their business. Americans did not see the war as a reason for their ships to be seized, as
they believed that free trade with all parties should not be impinged upon.
This issue of arms sales led to great tensions between the American government and those
governments of the belligerent nations. In 1915, Austria vehemently denounced the expansion of
munitions plants inside the United States for the express purpose of manufacturing arms. Austria
demanded that the United States stop the possible planned industrial expansion that would see new
plants built alongside the already existing factories to supply weapons and ammunition. In a
response piece to that focused on Austrian demands printed in the New York Times, the author lays
out the Austrian argument succinctly:
It [the Austrian Government], however, did protest against the creation of new and
extension of existing plants for the manufacturing of and exporting of war materials to such
an extent that the economic life of the United States has practically, so to say, become
militarized…the concentration of a large part of the American working power toward one
goal, namely, the supply of munitions…invalidates any reference to previous wars.14

The issue was not that American munitions were reaching Britain and France and not Austria;
rather the Austrian government was arguing that if American industry started to focus strictly on
the production of war material, the United States was no longer a neutral country. The Austrians
knew that American arms and munitions would not be able to reach their ports but they did not
demand a complete embargo. That type of demand would have also forced the Americans to violate
their neutrality. If the Americans were forced by the Central Powers to enact an embargo, Britain
and France would suffer for lack of those vital missing chemicals for munitions. The laws of war
would dictate that the United States had chosen one side over another. American neutrality meant
that some war materials would reach the Allies and not the Central Powers.
As more and more munitions were shipped from American ports, the awareness of just how much
was being sent to the battlefield was realized. Regular reports discussing monthly shipments of
munitions dawned on American public awareness. This awareness did raise questions among
14
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Americans of whether they were actually neutral. The Austrian demands also raised a
number of economic and moral issues. The pre-war American economy had been relatively
weak; with the war, the economy was booming and items not available for manufacture in Europe
ensured American prosperity and expansion. But what was the ethical cost of this war-material
export industry?
Americans themselves were concerned about the legality, as well as the morality, of selling
munitions to warring nations. Numerous letters to the editor and opinion pieces were printed
discussing this topic between 1914 and America’s entry into the war in April 1917. The Atlantic
Conference of German Baptists stated their moral objections and their desire to keep America from
exporting any arms: “We therefore earnestly protest against any exportation of things which kill
any of the warring nations of Europe.”15
The New York Times published several op-eds by Professor Theodore Woolsey, a former
International Law lecturer from Yale University, which discussed the legal and ethical morality of
American munition sales. He argued that the United States treated both sets of belligerents equally
which ensured American neutrality. His argument rests on the fact that both sides have equal access
to buy U.S. arms, but that Germany cannot carry this out because of a lack of transportation across
the Atlantic. He stated:
She [Germany] cannot transport, because she does not care to contest the control of the
seas with her enemies. Have we [The United States] aught to do with that? To supplement
her naval inferiority by denying the Allied the fruits of their superiority would be
equivalent to sharing in the war on the German side…notice no complaints of our exports
of munitions have come from the German Government.”16

Later in the same article, Professor Woolsey pointedly expressed who he blamed for such
complaints reaching the United States Government: “The opposition to the trade seems to come
from two classes: 1) German sympathizers…and 2) those who are governed by their emotions
rather than reason and respect for law.”17
The flow of munitions from the United States to European battlefields did not slow down because
of the arguments and protests against their sale; rather every month saw orders from Britain,
France, and even Russia increase as the massive battlefield expenditures of ammunition swelled.
The New York Times reported on 14 June 1915, “It was said yesterday that the serious shortage of
ammunition by the British, French, and Russian armies has spurred manufacturers in this country
to extraordinary efforts to forward supplies in the shortest amount of time.”18 It was reported that
around $30 million worth of supplies went to the Allies that April. The New York Times in
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September reported “that shipments of horses, mules, automobiles, aeroplanes, and
explosives all classed as war supplies, aggregated nearly $50,000,000 in July.”19
The monthly exports of munitions and other war supplies only increased in volume after 1915.
The quantity of bullets and shells used in Europe, and further afield, grew as major land battles
increased during 1916. The Battles of Verdun and the Somme alone consumed hundreds of
thousands of heavy shells and millions of bullets. All of these munitions needed to be replaced and
new stockpiles established. American industry increased by expanding existing plants and building
new facilities.
Chemical companies inside the United States needed to increase their own production in order to
fill the requirements of the ammunition plants. The manufacture of existing types of bullets and
shells continued throughout the war in order to fulfill the orders sent from Allied governments. In
addition to the older models, new types of weapons were also produced. Dow Chemical, based out
of Midland, Michigan, invented a magnesium bullet, known today as a tracer bullet, which allowed
soldiers to track where their bullets were traveling. “Dow was a major source of explosives and
other chemicals, devoting 90 percent of its production to war material such as phenol and
magnesium.”20 With nearly 90 percent of Dow Chemical’s production switched to war-materials,
Austrian fears of American industrial expansion were confirmed.
In addition to magnesium production, Dow Chemical also received orders to begin production of
mustard gas. Mustard gas is a chemical weapon that was developed late in the First World War.
Germany was the first to use this weapon in 1917; before this the majority of chemical weapon
attacks consisted of chlorine gas that suffocated the victims. Mustard gas was a new substance that
could not only cause death by asphyxiation, but also painful blisters on any exposed tissue.
The U.S. Army requested that Dow Chemical produce the compounds necessary to create an
American version of mustard gas. Dow Chemical produced and shipped out more than 100 tons’
worth of mustard oil. This mustard oil could then be added into specially designed artillery shells.
Once those shells were fired and exploded, the mustard oil went from a liquid to an aerosol form
which permeated the battlefield. Even with gas masks on, soldiers were not necessarily spared: the
aerosol would land on uniforms and then soak into the material. The soaked uniforms would then
transfer the oil onto skin and cause painful blisters to spread.
The U.S. Army deemed it necessary to have its own chemical warfare program to create new
protection techniques for its soldiers as well as to produce its own chemical weapons. Since this
was a new type of warfare, the United States had to build its resources almost from the ground up.
Gas masks, antidotes, and chemically treated uniforms (to provide additional protection from
attack) were just some of the things that American chemists needed to perfect. They had to
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decipher reports from the Allies as to what elements comprised the German chemical
weapon compounds and experiment to see how to protect soldiers against them.
The U.S. Army used controlled exposure to tear gas in training (another chemical weapon
developed early in the War) to give American soldiers a better understanding of how to prepare
and defend against chemical attacks. This gave the soldiers a firsthand experience as to the effects
of the chemical without a gas mask, allowing them a personal example of how quickly these
chemicals can be debilitating. In 1917, American soldiers were given additional training as they
arrived in France by British and French officers who had survived German chemical attacks.

Conclusion
American chemical companies during the First World War proved to be essential to the victory of
the Allies. Without American munitions and fertilizer flooding into Britain, France, and the United
States itself, the early German advantage in chemical production may have given victory to the
Central Powers. The millions of rounds of ammunition that were ordered and delivered to the
Allies during the period of America’s neutrality helped to keep the British and French militaries
fighting. By the time the United States entered the war in April 1917, the expansion of the
American chemical companies in the immediately preceding years ensured that ammunition and
chemical weapon production could match demand.
In addition, American efforts to create its own synthetic fertilizers from local products and
chemicals gave the United States the ability to meet not only the needs of its own people, but those
of the Allied nations as well. The ingenious use of either seaweed off the California coast or the
exploitation of salt lakes in Nebraska gave a new source of potash. While prices of these artificial
fertilizers were high, they did provide American farmers with a means to continue producing food
and not bankrupt themselves. For many of the new fertilizer companies, the end of the war meant
the closure of the plants that required so much time, money, and effort to build.
Once hostilities ceased, the American chemical companies were prepared to receive the cheaper,
more plentiful German chemical compounds they expected. But they did not completely abandon
the cooperation they had gained with the United States military. Instead, American chemical
companies kept contact with the US Army and continued to develop new weapons and protection
equipment. That relationship established in the First World War would be used again in World
War II, Vietnam, and beyond. American chemical companies were, and continue to be, a twoedged blade: they have the ability to provide either life-giving or life-taking products depending
on who makes the order.
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